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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from the final judgment of the district court. The Utah Court 
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. The Utah Supreme Court 
has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Const, art. VIII, § 3; Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(3)(i), 78-2a-3 (1953). This matter is transferable to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did the district court err in allowing Fairway Distributing Company and 
Fairway, Ltd. ("Fairway") to amend the complaint to state a strict liability claim? 
2. The Restatement of Torts (2nd) § 402A, as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), imposes strict 
products liability upon "sellers." Did the district court err in entering judgment 
against Diehl Lumber Company ("Diehl") in spite of the jury's finding that Diehl was 
not a seller? 
3. Did the district court err in instructing the jury, over Diehl's objection, 
that a "broker" could be held strictly liable for defects in products "brokered?" 
4. Is the jury's finding that Diehl "brokered" the trusses supported by 
substantial admissible evidence? 
5. Did the district court err in giving the following instruction over Diehl's 
objection: 
The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products 
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as 
well as all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable 
for damages caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long 
as that party is in the business of, and gains profit from, distributing 
or otherwise disposing of the "product" in question through the stream of 
-1-
commerce. The primary justification for extending strict liability to all 
in the chain of distribution is to provide the "maximum" protection to the 
consumer. This policy is as applicable to those who never handle or 
control the product, as it is to those who do possess or control the 
product. In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor 
considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of the product is 
not a prerequisite for the imposition of strict liability. 
6. Did the district court err in allowing Fairway to introduce evidence of 
Diehlfs wealth? 
7. Did the court err in allowing Fairway to introduce evidence to support an 
unpled theory of "successor liability," or in refusing to give a corrective 
instruction? 
8 Did the district court err in dismissing Diehl's crossclaim against 
Truswall Systems, Inc. ("Truswal")? 
9. Is the jury's finding that Truswal was not at fault supported by 
substantial admissible evidence? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This action involves the collapse of a warehouse roof. The building was 
constructed by John Mark Bangerter ("Bangerter") in 1979. (Reporters transcript 
^he reporter's transcript is a little confusing. The Reporter has transcribed the 
proceedings of pre-trial hearings in separate volumes which are non consecutively 
paginated. The trial poceedings are transcribed in the volumes which are 
consecutively paginated. Pre-trial proceedings will be referred to by date and 
page, for example; (Tr., June 1, 1987, 10). Trial proceedings will be referred to 
by page alone, for example: (Tr. 318). Documents listed on the records index will 
be referred to by page number, for example: (R. 1370). 
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414). The building was sold in 1982 to Fairway- (Tr. 70) On January 24, 1984, a 
portion of the roof collapsed. (Tr. 67) 
The trusses in question were sold by Colonial Lumber, Inc. ("Colonial") to 
Bangerter. (Tr. 118-123; Plaintiffs' Ex. 6, R. 1570, attached as Appen. A). 
Colonial did not manufacture trusses. In 1979, when Colonial had a customer who 
wanted trusses, Colonial*s sales people called several truss makers, including Truss 
Teck, for competitive bids. The lowest price received from a truss maker would be 
marked up. The marked up price would be quoted to Colonial's customer. If the 
customer agreed to the price, Colonial would obtain engineering drawings from the 
truss maker, and forward them to Colonial's customer. After Colonial's customer 
approved the engineering drawings, the trusses were made. The trusses were 
frequently picked up and delivered by Colonial. (Tr. 115-117, 154-157, 434, 
441-442). 
If Truss Teck was the truss maker selected by Colonial, Colonial would later 
receive an invoice from Diehl. (Tr. 157-158). Receiving the invoice from Diehl was 
the only contact Colonial had with Diehl regarding the trusses. (Tr. 158). 
In 1979, Truss Teck was a fledgling company that made trusses. (Tr. 291-292, 
294-295). Truss Teck had its own sales staff, consisting of several people. (Tr. 
300). 
Truss Teck's customers would call and describe the trusses needed. The 
dimensions would be conveyed to Truswal. Truss Teck would receive a design drawing 
from Truswal detailing the type and amount of lumber and size and number of plates. 
This design was used to bid the price on the trusses. A work order was then filled 
out by Truss Teck showing the type of truss, the price, and a quote number. (Tr. 
152-153, 159, 305-309; Defendant's Ex. 1, R. 1570, attached as Appen. B). 
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Often an engineering drawing was sent to the customer for approval. If the 
price and engineering were approved by the customer, the trusses were made. The 
trusses were either picked up by the customer, shipped by Truss Teck or shipped by 
Diehl. Since Truss Teck did not have a computer or accounting staff, a copy of the 
work order would be sent to Diehl. Diehl would in turn generate an invoice and 
collect Truss Teck's accounts receivables. Diehl did not mark up the price to Truss 
Teck's customer, but rather, kept a small percentage of the receivable, when 
collected, for the accounting service. (Tr. 302-312, 318-320, 325-328). Shortly 
after 1979, Truss Teck purchased a computer and began doing its own billing. (Tr. 
325). 
In 1979, Diehl did not manufacture trusses. Diehl did not get involved in 
selling trusses. Diehl did not actively negotiate the sale of trusses between 
buyers and sellers. Diehl was simply a billing agent for Truss Teck. (Tr. 328-329, 
334-353). 
The paper trail concerning the trusses involved in this case begins with a work 
order from Truss Teck. (Tr. 152-153, 159, 305-309; Defendants' Ex. 1, R. 1570, 
attached as Appen. B). The work order references Bangerter and describes Colonial 
as Truss Teck's customer. The work order indicates the trusses were ordered by 
"Herb." Herb was a salesman for Colonial and one of three people at Colonial who 
frequently ordered trusses for Colonial. (Tr. 153, 172). The work order describes 
the trusses in question. Under the heading "ship via," the work order states: "w/c 
7-23-79" which means "will call," indicating the trusses were to be picked up from 
Truss Teck by Colonial or Bangerter on July 23, 1979. (Tr. 155, 309). 
The next document in the paper trail is an invoice from Diehl to Colonial, dated 
July 31, 1979. (Tr. 134-138; Plaintiffs Ex. 11, R. 1570, attached as Appen. C). 
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The invoice was not created until after the trusses had been ordered, made and 
picked up. (Tr. 168). The invoice references John Mark Bangerter and the Truss 
Teck work order number, 3176. The price on the Diehl invoice is exactly the same as 
the price stated on the Truss Teck work order. 
The next document in the paper trail is an invoice from Colonial to Bangerter. 
(Tr. 121-23; Plaintiffs' Ex. 6, R. 1570, attached as Appendix A). Colonial did mark 
up the price, reflecting the fact that Colonial had purchased and resold the trusses. 
Truss Teck was a corporation separate and distinct from Diehl. Truss Teck was 
founded by Gary Diehl in 1978. (Tr. 295). No Diehl officers or shareholders were 
involved in Truss Teck and no Truss Teck officers or shareholders were involved in 
Diehl. Diehl did not own stock in Truss Teck. Truss Teck did not own stock in 
Diehl. (Tr. 316). 
Until 1982, Truss Teck did business at 8169 South State, Midvale, Utah. Diehl 
was located approximately at 1700 South 700 West, Salt Lake City, Utah. In 1982, 
Truss Teck moved to 1840 South 700 West and rented property from Diehl. (Tr. 296). 
Later in 1982, Diehl purchased some truss manufacturing equipment from Truss 
Teck. Truss Teck did not sell its office equipment, good will, accounts 
receivables, inventory or customer list. These were sold to others to pay Truss 
Teckfs creditors. Diehl did not assume any liabilities of Truss Teck. Diehl did 
not use the Truss Teck name. (Tr. 300, 313-317). 
After purchasing some manufacturing equipment from Truss Teck in 1982, Diehl 
made trusses for a few years. Some of Truss Teck's employees were hired by Diehl. 
However, the officers and directors of Truss Teck did not become officers or 
directors of Diehl. (Tr. 315-317). 
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Truss Teck was dissolved in 1984. (Tr. 318; Defendants' Ex. 2, R. 1570). 
Fairway claims that the trusses had three defects. First, the plates on the 
trusses were undersized. Second, the plates were misplaced during manufacture. 
Third, the designer failed to consider additional strains which occurred at the 
"heel joint.1' (Tr. 254-267, 280-288). 
It is customary for truss makers to be associated with a plate manufacturing and 
engineering firm. Ordinarily, the truss maker purchases and stocks various sized 
plates from one particular plate manufacturer. Then, as trusses are manufactured 
for different applications, the plate manufacturer provides engineering services 
free of charge, so long as that manufacturer's plates are used. (Tr. 212-215, 220, 
278-279, 312-314, 394-396, 408-412). 
The plates used on the trusses in this particular building carry the Truswal 
logo. (Tr. 214). During 1979, Truss Teck used exclusively Truswal plates. In 
return for purchasing the plates, Truss Teck was entitled to receive engineering 
designs from Truswal free of charge. Truss Teck never attempted to design its own 
trusses, nor did it deviate from Truswal's designs. (Tr. 303-304, 308, 312-314). 
Despite the undisputed evidence that: 1) the trusses were defective because of an 
engineering flaw; 2) the plates were provided by Truswal; and 3) that it would have 
been very unusual and contrary to customary industry practices for Truswal plates to 
have been used without a Truswal design, the jury found that Truswal was not at 
fault for the collapse. (R. 1376, attached as Appen. D). 
The original complaint stated two claims against Diehl. The Second Claim for 
Relief alleged that Diehl impliedly warranted the trusses as merchantable and fit 
for a particular purpose. The Third Claim for Relief alleged that Diehl negligently 
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breached its duty to properly advise the contractors as to the proper means and 
methods of installing, connecting and bracing the trusses. The remainder of the 
complaint contained claims against other defendants. (R. 2-9). 
In July, 1985, Fairway moved for leave to amend. (R. 163-166). The proposed 
amended complaint contained an additional strict liability claim and added 
additional defendants. (R. 167-177). 
On August 23, 1985, the district court entered an order requiring plaintiffs to 
file a verified factual statement about each party to be added, stating the 
evidence that justified adding each new party. The order granted Fairway 15 days 
to file the required statement, after which the court would rule on the motion to 
amend. (The order is not part of the record. But see, R. 753-755). Fairway 
failed to file any verified statement and did not make any objection to the order 
as it related to the proposed strict liability claim. On September 11, 1985, the 
court entered another order denying Fairway's motion to amend. (The order is not 
part of the record. But see, R. 753-755). 
On February 10, 1987, at a pretrial conference, the court set a trial date of 
July 29, 1987. Nothing was said by Fairway regarding the strict liability at that 
time. (R. 302, 305-307). 
On June 1, 1987 another pretrial conference was held. Again, nothing was said 
by Fairway about a claim for strict liability at that time. (Tr., June 1, 1987, 
1-40). 
On June 16, 1987 Fairway filed a Rule 60(b)(1) motion entitled "Motion to 
Correct Court Order or in the Alternative to Amend Complaint to Include a Cause of 
Action Based on Strict Liability." (The motion is not part of the record. But 
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see, Tr. , June 23, 1987, 31-45). Diehl objected to Fairway's motion to correct 
the order on the following grounds: 
1. The motion was not brought within three months after entry of the order 
that Fairway asked be corrected, or within a reasonable time as required by 
U. R. Civ, P. 60(b). 
2. Fairway had not met its burden of showing excusable neglect or other 
justification for modifying the court's earlier order, as required by U. R. Civ. P. 
60(b). 
3. Diehl would be prejudiced by the late introduction of a new claim which 
Diehl was not prepared to defend. 
4. If Fairway's strict liability claim had been raised earlier, Diehl would 
have been able to raise an indemnification claim against Truss Teck. As of June, 
1987, Diehl's indemnification claims against Truss Teck were barred by Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 78-12-25.5, 16-10-100 (1953). (Tr., June 23, 1987, 3-45; R. 738-748). 
On July 9, 1987 the court granted Fairway leave to amend and postponed trial 
until October 28, 1987. (R. 753-755). 
At the final pretrial conference, Fairway voluntarily dropped its claims of 
negligence and breach of warranty, admitting there was no evidence to support those 
claims. (Tr., October 13, 1987, 21). Counsel for Fairway represented that Truswal 
had settled Fairway's claims against Truswal. (Tr., October 13, 1987, 22, 24-27). 
On October 27, 1987 Truswal filed and argued a motion to enforce a settlement 
between Fairway and Truswal. Truswal alleged that Fairway had agreed to execute a 
release which would cut off crossclaims against Truswal by reducing any judgment 
against the remaining defendants by the greater of the amount paid by Truswal or 
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the percentage of Truswal*s fault, as provided by Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-42, 
78-21-43 (1953) (repealed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 et. seg.) (1987)). The 
court dismissed Truswal but did not resolve the issue of whether or not Truswal*s 
fault would go to the jury, or whether remaining defendants would be given credit 
for the greater of the amount Truswal paid in settlement or Truswal's share of 
negligence. (Tr., October 27, 1987, 15-38). 
On October 28th, 29th, and 30th, 1987, Fairway's strict liability claim against 
defendants Colonial Lumber Company and Diehl was tried to a jury. 
Over Diehl's objection (Tr. 451) the case was tried to the jury on the theory 
that a "broker" could be held strictly liable for defects in a product "brokered." 
The court defined a broker as follows: 
Definition of broker: An agent employed to make bargains and contracts 
for a compensation. A middleman or negotiator between parties. A person 
whose business it is to bring buyer and seller together. Buyers and 
sellers of goods and negotiators between buyers and sellers, but without 
having custody of the property. 
(Instruction No. 21, R. 1359; Tr. 456). 
Also over Diehl's objection, Fairway was allowed to introduce evidence of 
Diehlfs wealth. (Tr. 330-331). The trial court refused to give an instruction to 
minimize the prejudice caused by such evidence. (Tr. 453). 
Before trial, Diehl received Fairway's proposed jury instructions, which 
included proposed instructions on a new "successor liability" theory of recovery. 
Fairway claimed for the first time that Diehl was liable for the debts of Truss 
Teck, because Diehl purchased some assets from Truss Teck in 1982, several years 
after these trusses were made. On October 28, Diehl filed a written objection to 
Fairway trying the case on the new successor liability claim. (R. 1198-1204). 
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Diehl objected because this claim had not been raised in the pleadings or the 
pretrial order. Over Diehl's objections, Fairway was allowed to introduce evidence 
which Fairway claimed supported the new claim, including the wealth of Truss Teck 
and Diehl, and the personal relationship between some of the shareholders of the two 
corporations. (Tr. 292-302). 
At the close of plaintiff's case, Diehl moved for directed verdict. That motion 
was granted as to the "successor liability" claim, but denied as to the strict 
liability claim. (Tr., 363-368). The trial court refused to given an instruction 
which would have resolved some of the confusion caused by some of the "successor 
liability" evidence. (Tr. 453). 
The jury returned answers to special interrogatories, finding that Diehl did not 
sell the trusses in question, but had "brokered" the trusses in question. (R. 
1375-1377, attached as Appen. D). 
On February 4, 1988, the court entered final judgment against Diehl for the 
entire amount of the damages found by the jury less the amount that Truswal had paid 
in settlement, together with prejudgment interest. (R. 1566-1570, attached as 
Appen. E). 
Diehl requests that the judgment be reversed, and that Fairway's claims against 
Diehl be dismissed with prejudice. In the alternative, the judgment against Diehl 
should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court for a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN MODIFYING ITS EARLIER ORDER AND 
ALLOWING FAIRWAY TO AMEND. 
A. U. R. Civ. P. 60(b) Required Plaintiffs to Show Excusable Neglect and 
Bring the Motion Within Three Months After the Court's Original Order 
Denying Leave to Amend. 
Fairway claims the trial court erred in 1985 when the court denied Fairway's 
motion to amend. It was not error for the court to refuse to adopt Fairway's sloppy 
practice. If there was error it was Fairway's, alone. 
The primary focus of the proposed Amended Complaint was the addition of new 
parties. By Fairway's own admission, when Fairway was challenged on whether they 
had sufficient evidence to add new parties, Fairway simply decided to let the matter 
drop by not responding to the court's directive to file verified statements. (Tr., 
June 23, 1987, 32-33). The trial court rightfully concluded that Fairway was not 
interested. 
At that point in time, the amended complaint as proposed was not proper, without 
substantial modification. Fairway could and should have redrafted the proposed 
amended complaint, dropping the reference to the proposed new parties. Fairway 
could and should have filed a new motion to file an amended complaint which was 
consistent with the court's ruling and which also contained the strict liability 
claim. The error was Fairway's sloppy practice, not the court's insistence on 
proper procedure. 
Fairway characterized their motion as one brought under 60(b) U. R. Civ. P., 
which states: 
-1*1-
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 
order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) When, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been 
personally served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the 
defendant has failed to appear in said action; 
(5) The judgment is void; 
(6) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 
vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or 
(7) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after the 
judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. . . . 
Even assuming there was some error other than Fairway's, Rule 60(b) does not 
allow the court discretion to waive the three month requirement. Nor can the court 
avoid the three month limitation by resorting to subparagraph 7 when the ground 
asserted for relief falls with subparagraph 1. E.g., Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 
1193, 1195 (Utah 1984). Even if the district court were free to manipulate the rule 
in such a fashion, a motion made pursuant to subparagraph 7 must still be made 
within a reasonable time. Fairway waited nearly two years to correct the asserted 
"error." Two years is not even arguably reasonable. 
Rule 60(b) serves the same strong policies that support the "law of the case" 
doctrine. 
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[I]n the interest of economy of time and efficiency of procedure, it is 
desirable to avoid the delays and the difficulties involved in repetitious 
contentions and rulings upon the same proposition in the same case. 
Richardson v. Grand Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977). Obviously this 
policy is not so strong as to preclude all modifications of existing orders. But, 
it is strong enough to require that a motion to modify an existing order be made 
timely. 
Nor did plaintiffs bear their burden of showing excusable neglect. There is no 
question that there was neglect: 
Mr. Baker: The Court later on, because we didn't file those factual 
statements relative to parties, the Motion to Amend is denied. Now, 
somehow that slipped between the cracks and I did not focus on the facts 
that the total motion, according to this document, had been [denied]. I 
had just sort of assumed in my mind that the motion relative to the strict 
liability had been granted and was in the case. So, it was only when I 
was going back recently to find out and to check the pleadings that I 
caught that error. 
(Tr., June 23, 1987, 33). 
I made a mistake in not catching it . . . . 
Id. 
Your Honor, I agree I made a mistake. I should have brought that to the 
Court's attention . . . . 
(Tr., June 23, 1987, 43). 
I was wrong, too. I should have caught it. I certainly was negligent in 
not catching it . . . . 
(Tr., June 23, 1987, 44). But, Rule 60(b) requires a showing of excusable neglect, 
not just neglect. 
At the hearing Fairway took the position that while its motion cited Rule 60(b), 
that was a typographical error. They really intended to rely upon Rule 60(a). Rule 
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60(a), however, cannot be used to avert rule 60(b) if it was not a clerical error. 
E.g., Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984). 
In that case, Lindsay sued Atkin and Nyberg on a promissory note executed by 
them listing Southern Utah Hay Company as promissor. Parrish Oil Tools was brought 
into the action upon Lindsay's motion to include all parties with an interest. 
Later, the parties determined that Parrish was a limited partner of Southern Utah 
Hay. At pretrial, Lindsay's attorney invited Parrish to submit an order of 
dismissal, since, as a limited partner, they were not a proper party. Parrish 
submitted an order of dismissal with prejudice which was signed. Atkin and Nyberg 
were found liable. After satisfying the judgment they sued Parrish for 
contribution. Parrish raised the dismissal with prejudice as a defense. Atkin and 
Nyberg moved, pursuant to Rule 60(a), to modify the order to one dismissing without 
prejudice. That motion was denied and the Utah Supreme Court affirmed, stating: 
This Court has differentiated between clerical errors and judicial errors, 
stating: 
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does 
not depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was 
made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as 
rendered. 46 Am.Jr.2d Judgments § 202. 
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 317, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) 
(emphasis added). The correction contemplated by Rule 60(a) must be 
undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the court 
and parties. 6A Moore's Federal Practice § 60.06[1] (2d ed. 1983). Rule 
60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a substantial nature, 
particularly where the claim of error is unilateral. The fact that an 
intention was subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the 
mistake to be "clerical." See Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333 (7th 
Cir. 1972). 
In the instant case, the error complained of may not be characterized 
as "clerical." The court may have erred in granting Parrish Oil Tools a 
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dismissal with prejudice, but the appropriate remedy was a timely motion 
to amend and/or a timely appeal to this Court. 
Id. at 402. 
In this case there is no indication, whatever, that the court intended to do 
anything other than that which it did in 1985. The court may not have even been 
conscious of the fact that the proposed amended complaint contained an additional 
claim against existing parties. It is not the job of a busy trial court to 
carefully compare the original complaint and amended complaint. The court dealt 
with the objections raised and denied the motion to amend in toto. The fact that 
intent was subsequently found to be mistaken, if it was, does not cause the mistake 
to be "clerical." If the court erred in 1985, the appropriate remedy was for 
Fairway to draft a new proposed amendment without the additional parties and bring a 
new motion to amend, or for Fairway to bring a timely Rule 60(b) motion. 
What is meant by the term "clerical error" is best illustrated by the case of 
Meagher v. Equity Oil Co., 299 P.2d 827 (Utah 1956). In that case the judge signed 
an order prepared by counsel without reading it carefully. The court assumed it 
comported his earlier written and oral rulings. The order had not been circulated 
to counsel and was inconsistent with an earlier Supreme Court decision in the same 
matter. 
It is true that U. R. Civ. P. 15 gives the trial court discretion to grant leave 
to amend. However, the general provisions of Rule 15 should give to the more 
specific dictates of Rule 60 where the matter has previously been ruled upon. Rule 
15 should not be used to avert Rule 60. 
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B. Diehl Was Prejudiced by the Untimely Amendment. 
The trial court cannot ignore Rule 60 and rely upon Rule 15. But, even if it 
could, before the district court can grant leave to amend under Rule 15, it must 
consider whether the opposing side will be prejudiced: 
A primary consideration that a trial judge must take into account in 
determining whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing side 
would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for 
which he had not had time to prepare. 
Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983). 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld as proper the refusal of trial 
courts to allow new claims when the plaintiff has given some indication that a 
theory will not be relied upon, or the plaintiff knew of the basis for a new claim 
for some time before moving to amend. E.g., Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360, 365 
(Utah 1984); Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983); Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
Diehl has a constitutional right to fair notice of the nature and basis of 
claims against it. Diehl also has a right to a reasonable opportunity to prepare 
and be heard on those claims. 
Notice and an opportunity to be heard are elementary reguirements of due 
process of law when the rights of a party are to be affected by judicial 
proceeding. 
Denver & R.G.W.R. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612, 612 (1929). 
Notwithstanding all of our efforts to eliminate technicalities and 
liberalize procedure, we must not lose sight of the cardinal principal 
that under our system of justice, if an issue is to be tried and the 
party's right concluded with respect thereto, he must have notice thereof 
and an opportunity to meet it. 
National Farmer's Union Property & Casualty Co. v. Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 286 P.2d 
249, 253 (1955). See also, U.S. Const. Amend. V, cl.3; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. 
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Courts should deny motions to amend when the party seeking to amend is not able 
to give an adequate justification for the delay: 
Girard's inability to state an adequate reason for the untimeliness of the 
motion discloses that this is not a case where "justice requires" an 
amendment. On the other hand, the disadvantage defendants would face if 
required to meet the new causes of action reveals that the interests of 
justice will best be served by the court's denial of the motion to amend. 
Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983). 
On the facts presented, we are not convinced that the trial court abused 
its discretion in refusing to grant the requested leave to amend. An 
amendment would certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of 
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full year earlier when plaintiff 
discussed it in his deposition. 
Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983). 
Diehl's prejudice is palpable and significant. Prior to the amendment, trial 
required little preparation of Diehl. Fairway had no evidence to support even a 
prima facie claim of negligence or breach of warranty, a fact which Fairway conceded. 
Mr. Baker: We have determined that we will not proceed with the 
negligence counts. I think negligence, which we had alleged, were [sic] 
based upon failure of Diehl and Colonial to supervise the installation and 
we don't feel we have sufficient evidence to move forward on that so we 
will withdraw that. With respect to the warranty, we don't have 
sufficient evidence. 
(Tr., October 13, 1987, 21). 
With the amended complaint, Diehl was forced to prepare a defense in less than 
four months. 
Compounding the problem of preparing a defense in an expedited fashion was the 
fact that the product in question had been manufactured eight years before. 
Important witnesses, such as employees of Truss Teck and Colonial, had died or moved 
away. Important documents, such as the engineering design of Truswal for these 
particular trusses, had been lost or discarded. 
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Had Fairway's claims been raised in a timely manner, Diehl could have sought 
indemnity from the manufacturer, Truss Teck. Diehl chose not to seek indemnity from 
Truss Teck on the negligence and warranty claims earlier for the same reason that 
Diehl did not require much trial preparation before the amendment. Fairway simply 
did not have sufficient evidence to put on a prima facie case. After the amendment, 
however, Truss Teck was protected from an indemnity claim by the statues of repose 
contained in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-12-25.5, 16-10-100 (1953), which state: 
No action to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, 
or for any injury to the person, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, 
arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to 
real property, nor any action for damages sustained on account of such 
injury, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the 
design, planning, supervision of construction or construction of such 
improvement to real property more than seven years after the completion of 
construction. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25.5 (1953). 
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a 
certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and Commercial 
Code, or (2) by a decree of court when the court has not liquidated the 
assets and business of the corporation as provided in this act, or (3) by 
expiration of its period of duration, shall not take away or impair any 
remedy available to or against the corporation, its directors, officers, 
or shareholders, for any right or claim existing, or any liability 
incurred, prior to such dissolution if action or other proceeding thereon 
is commenced within two years after the date of such dissolution. . . . 
Utah code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1953). 
It is true that ordinarily a cause of action for contribution or indemnity does 
not accrue, and therefore the statute of limitations does not begin to run, until 
the party seeking contribution or indemnity pays more than its fair share. But 
these are statutes of repose, which run regardless of when the cause of action 
accrues. Annot., When Statute of Limitations Commences to Run Against Claims For 
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Contribution or Indemnity Based on Tort, 57 ALR 3d 867 § 4[d] (1974). Nevada 
Lakeshore Co. v. Diamond Elec, Inc., 511 P.2d 113, 115 (Nev. 1973); Agus v. Future 
Chattanooga Dev. Corp., 358 F. Supp. 246, 251 (D. Term. 1973). 
POINT II 
UNDER UTAH LAW, ONLY "SELLERS" ARE STRICTLY LIABLE. 
In the case of Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152, 156 (Utah 
1979), this court adopted strict products liability as announced by the Restatement 
of Torts (2d) § 402A, which states: 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to 
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or 
consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product, and 
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. 
(2) The rules stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) The seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) The user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
The term "sale" is defined by the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-106 (1980), which states: 
A "sale" consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for 
a price. . • . 
That statute is part of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. Article 2 
deals with the sale of goods and includes many provisions dealing with the law of 
warranty. E.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-313, 70A-2-314, 70A-2-315 (1980). Strict 
liability evolved from warranty law. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 
P.2d 152, 155-56 (Utah 1979). Because warranty law and strict liability are closely 
related, it is entirely appropriate to apply the same definition of "sale" and 
••seller" to both. 
There is no evidence that Diehl sold the trusses in question. The jury found 
that Diehl was not a seller. (R. 1375-1377, attached as Appen. E). That finding 
should have resolved the issued of strict liability completely. Utah law simply 
does not impose strict products liability upon persons other than sellers. 
Nor should the law of products liability be expanded to impose liability upon 
those who are not sellers. The assumptions and policies supporting imposing strict 
liability upon manufacturers arguably do not apply when strict liability is applied 
to sellers who are not manufacturers. They clearly do not apply to the agents of 
sellers, such as brokers and sales clerks. 
The primary focus of strict products liability is the manufacturer, and there 
appear to be three policy justifications for imposing strict liability upon 
manufacturers: 
1. "Deep pocket1' or Mrisk spreading theory." The costs of damaging events due 
to defectively dangerous products are thought to best be borne by the enterprises 
that make the products: 
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the costs of injuries 
resulting from defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put 
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are 
powerless to protect themselves. . . . 
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 
897, 901 (1962) (in bank); Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed.), pp. 692-93 (1984). 
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A manufacturer, the theory goes, can best: (1) absorb an occasional economic 
loss; (2) raise the price of its goods to recoup a loss, thus spreading the cost to 
many buyers, rather than one; or (3) spread the risk by purchasing insurance; which 
will ultimately result in an increased price of the goods, thus, again, spreading 
the loss to many buyers, rather than one. 
Underlying the theory is an assumption about the relative wealth of the buyer 
and the manufacturer. The assumption is the manufacturer is a large corporation, 
creating products in mass. The buyer is powerless or at least at an economic 
disadvantage. 
On average, the assumption is probably correct. In today's competitive market, 
most products must be produced in large, highly technical and specialized plants 
which achieve economies of scale. Building and operating such plants requires large 
amounts of capital. 
The assumption, however, is not universally correct. There are still small 
manufacturers, cottage industries, and tradesman who create custom products. Some 
products are necessarily custom made, such as these trusses. Some products must be 
made totally in smaller plants because of transportation costs. There are 
manufacturers who cannot survive a disastrous experience with a particular product. 
There are manufacturers who cannot afford insurance premiums. 
The assumption concerning the economic disadvantage of the buyer is so strong 
that the term "consumer'* is frequently used, or rather, misused. The term 
"consumer" implies an individual purchasing a product for home or family use. But 
as presently applied, strict liability is not limited to consumer buyers. For 
example, in the case of Ernest W, Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 
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1979), the buyer was a corporation that operated a relatively large retail shopping 
mall. In the present case, the plaintiffs are business entities, rather than 
"consumers." 
Large manufacturers are themselves large buyers of other products. The state, 
federal and local governments are large buyers of products. 
Nor is the assumption that buyers are unable to bear the risk always correct. 
Buyers too can insure against losses with property insurance, as in this case, 
health, life, disability and business interruption insurance. Many products cases 
arise out of work-related injuries, for which workmen's compensation benefits are 
available. 
We do not require the plaintiff in a products action to prove the manufacturer 
is actually better able to absorb or spread the risk. For example, in this case we 
have a large national insurance company that received a premium to assume the very 
risk involved. It seeks, by way of subrogation, to recover that loss from a small 
to medium sized local corporation and its large national insurance carrier. Who is 
best able to bear or distribute the loss? That was never addressed at the trial 
level, and rightfully so. The law of strict liability does not ask who is best able 
to handle the risk in each case. We are content to assume that the seller is best 
able to handle the loss "on average." 
2. Promotion of accident prevention. 
It is sometimes said that the cause of accident prevention can be promoted by 
strict liability. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 
1041-42 (1974); Prosser and Keeton on Torts (5th ed.), p. 693 (1984). 
Again, this policy is based upon an assumption. We assume the manufacturer is 
in the best position to have prevented the accident, if anyone was, and is in the 
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best position to make changes to prevent future accidents. The manufacturer 
generally designs the product, selects the materials, shapes and assembles the 
materials, selects components made by others, packages and labels the product and 
provides written instructions. The manufacturer is assumed to have more expertise 
than the buyer. The manufacturer tests the product, both during the development of 
the product and after manufacture. The manufacturer is generally familiar with 
special concerns, conditions of use, and the regulatory requirements of government 
entities. 
The assumption is that the buyers have little or no ability to discover or 
appreciate the defects in today's complex and technical products. The consumer 
cannot be expected to disassemble for inspection a car, television or home computer, 
let alone understand the product enough to effectively inspect the product if it 
were disassembled. 
Again, the assumption, as applied to manufacturers, appears to be sound on 
average, but not universally correct. Some products are very simple. Their defects 
are as easily discernible to buyers as to manufacturers. Some manufacturers are 
unsophisticated. Some consumers are very sophisticated. Some products are custom 
made to the buyer's design. 
Moreover, even if the assumption were correct, there are some who would argue 
that strict liability, as it is applied, may not induce greater care than liability 
based on negligence. See, Raleigh, The "State of the Art" in Product Liability: A 
New Look at an Old "Defense,", 4 Ohio N.L. Rev. 249 (1977); Plant, Strict Liability 
of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by Defects in Products - An Opposing View, 24 
Term.L.Rev. 938 (1957). If the manufacturer has done all that is reasonable and 
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prudent, what more could the manufacturer have done to have prevented the accident? 
If an accident discloses a defect in a product, which could not have been 
anticipated or discovered through reasonable care earlier, then the manufacturer 
will be liable under a theory of negligence if the manufacturer unreasonably fails 
to take necessary steps to eliminate future accidents. What contribution has strict 
liability made to accident prevention in that situation? 
3. Difficulty of the buyer proving negligence. 
Even if fault were the primary justification for imposing liability on a 
manufacturer, such fault is often difficult for the buyer to prove. Phipps v. 
General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
(5th ed.), p. 693 (1984). 
Again, this policy is based upon an assumption. It is assumed that 
manufacturers produce products in large numbers. A particular product is often made 
in one of several different plants, widely geographically dispersed. The 
manufacturing process often involves many minute steps, each dependent upon those 
that came before. For each shift in the plant, each step or process is controlled 
by a particular individual or group of individuals. Often the steps are performed 
with little human intervention by machine. There may be three or four shifts each 
day and many changes in personnel over time. Even if the individuals responsible 
could be isolated, how could they recall this one individual item, which they dealt 
with briefly and mechanically, among hundreds of undistinguishable items. 
The manufacturer, on the other hand, understands the process and can, if anyone 
can, prove there was no negligence. 
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Again, however, the assumptions are only sound Mon average." Many products are 
simple or produced in small numbers. There are many government and industry 
standards which assist in evaluating a manufacturer's materials and procedures. 
Evidence of negligence is often available from the product itself. The doctrine of 
res ipsa loguitur may be available in the negligence action. 
The assumption is based upon the scenario of a manufacturing defect. Many 
products cases involve claims of poor design. While a particular product is 
replicated hundreds, thousands or perhaps millions of times, the design is common to 
all of these identical products, and occurs but once. For many products, design 
drawings will te available. Often there is no dispute about what the design was. 
The dispute hinges on whether or not the design was adequate. The dispute 
concerning adequacy of design more likely will involve opinion testimony from 
experts, rather than factual evidence. This evidence is necessary to prove a 
dangerous defect in the product under strict liability, whether the plaintiff must 
also prove a standard of care and breach of that standard of care, or not. 
A design case may require an analysis of risk versus utility, which is similar, 
but not identical, to a negligence standard. See, Barker v. Lull Eng. Co., 20 Cal. 
3d 413, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 573 P.2d 443, 457 (1978); Turner v. General Motors 
Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850-851 (Tex. 1979). See also Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
(5th ed.), pp. 699-700 (1984); Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: 
Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening in Product Liability Litigation, 11 Hofstra 
L.Rev. 861 (1983); Davidson, The Uncertain Search for Design Defect Standard, 30 
Amer.Univ.L.Rev. 643 (1981). 
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If difficulty of proof is really the concern, is strict liability going too 
far? Would a rebuttable presumption of negligence and a shift of the burden of 
proof solve the problem, without abolishing negligence principles entirely? 
The policies of strict liability are not without flaws. One of the goals is to 
spread the risk, which by definition means an increase in the price of products. 
But the price will be increased not only because of meritorious claims, but because 
of those that lack merit. 
Automobiles, for example, will always be involved in collisions. It is 
impossible to build a car that will prevent injury to its occupants in all 
circumstances. Even if it could be done, few buyers could afford such a car. The 
increased use of limited resources, and resulting weight, and resulting increased 
fuel consumption and resulting increased pollution may not be viewed by all as a 
completely positive result. But, what is the proper balance in the design of an 
automobile? The question is often debatable and debated. And products cases can be 
extraordinarily expensive to try. An automobile manufacturer, having won the battle 
on the question as to whether a particular make and model of product was defectively 
designed in some precise particular, may face exactly the same battle again and 
again, as the outcome is not binding upon plaintiffs who are not party to the action. 
Increased costs can, in some instances, be more than a minor inconvenience to be 
passed along by the manufacturer to buyers. Pertussis is a horrible, deadly 
disease. For reasons yet unknown, a very small, but predictable, fraction of a 
percentage of children inoculated with Pertussis vaccine will develop an adverse 
reaction ranging from fever, to brain damage to death. The vaccine continues to be 
used because health officials believe the risk of death from the disease is greater 
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than the risk of adverse reaction. Moreover, if everyone is inoculated, the disease 
may be virtually, if not literally, eliminated, such as polio and small pox have 
been. Once the disease is eliminated, not only will the risk from the disease be 
eliminated, but inoculation can be stopped and that risk eliminated as well. Many 
states, for example, have laws which require Pertussis vaccination. E.g., Senn v. 
Merrell-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 305 Or. 256, 751 P.2d 215 (Ore. 1988) (en banc); 
Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
In spite of the Restatement of Torts (2d) § 402A, Comment k, vaccine 
manufacturers face suits regularly. The manufacturers claim that a major portion of 
the cost of the vaccine today goes to pay defense and liability costs. Intuitively, 
we understand, and economists agree, that with many products, an increase in cost 
may result in decreased demand. As a product becomes more expensive, fewer people 
choose to purchase it. What of the child whose parents cannot or will not pay for 
the vaccine because of the increased cost? If that child contracts Pertussis, who 
will compensate that child? Where shall we spread that risk? What of attempts to 
eliminate the disease and the risk from both disease and vaccine? 
Arguably, many products are safer today than just a few years ago. Is it 
possible that increased prices of new products encourage people to keep older, less 
safe, products in use longer? 
Will this increased risk spreading discourage competition from new, smaller 
manufacturers who cannot absorb the losses, cannot afford insurance or have an 
insufficient history in the industry to obtain insurance? 
-?7-
Will some manufacturers simply stop making risky, but useful products? See 
Flood v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 183 Cal. App. 3d 1272, 228 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
Will new, innovative and potentially useful products not be made because risks 
are unknown? 
While the primary focus of strict liability is the manufacturer, we extend 
strict liability to other sellers as well. The courts appear to have done so, with 
little or no understanding that the assumptions which underlie the policy reasons 
for strict liability become even less accurate when sellers who are not 
manufacturers are considered. 
The assumption that the seller is best able to absorb the loss becomes more 
tenuous. There is only one General Motors, but General Motors sells cars to 
literally thousands of smaller independent dealers nationwide. The manufacturer 
that markets its products throughout the country or internationally usually must 
market its products through many smaller wholesalers and retailers. 
Arguably, the majority of this country's business enterprise is still small 
business. Many of these small businesses are involved in wholesaling and retailing 
products. 
The assumption that the seller is in the best position, if anyone, to prevent 
accidents becomes tenuous when applied to sellers who are not manufacturers. Some 
intermediate sellers do cause or contribute to the defect, or fail to discover the 
defect. Some have the ability and basis to select safer products or better 
manufacturers. However, many more products are purchased and resold, unaltered by 
intermediate sellers. The nature of products make it just as impossible for an 
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intermediate seller to inspect effectively as for the buyer. The dealer can't be 
expected to disassemble that T.V., stereo or automobile. Packaging may make 
effective inspection even more difficult for an intermediate seller than for the 
buyer. 
The assumption that proof is more difficult for the buyer is also tenuous. Most 
intermediate sellers are just as ignorant of the manufacturing process as the buyer. 
And the flaws in the policy become more apparent when strict liability is 
applied to sellers who are not manufacturers. Most products are marketed through at 
least one intermediate seller. Often there is a manufacturer, wholesaler and 
retailer. Sometimes there is a component manufacturer, the product manufacturer 
that purchases and incorporates the component part, a wholesaler, then retailers. 
If each must bear the risk of loss, an increment of cost is added at each step. If 
each must purchase insurance, the price of the product to the ultimate buyer may be 
increased not by one insurance premium, but by several premiums paid to several 
insurers for the same risk. 
Many of these intermediate sellers will be entitled to relief from the 
manufacturer. The Uniform Commercial Code, for example, may provide warranties, not 
only to the ultimate buyer, but to intermediate sellers as well. See, Utah Code 
Ann, §§ 70A-2-313, 70A-2-314, 70A-2-315 (1980). See also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 70A-2-607(5) (1980); Restatement of Torts (2d) § 886B. But, if this were 
universally so, why allow a buyer to sue an intermediate seller that did not cause 
the defect? 
Attorney's fees, expert fees, etc. cannot be recovered by the intermediate 
seller from the manufacturer, absent an agreement. 
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Good plaintiff's lawyers know that an increase in the number of defendants 
increases the value of nuisance suits. 
Arguably, this is a wasteful and unnecessarily increase the final cost to the 
buyer. 
The justification for extending strict liability to intermediate sellers is that 
it affords an alternative remedy when the manufacturer is insolvent. That 
justification appears to run counter to the assumption that manufacturers, on 
average, are better able to bear the risks. If that truly is the justification for 
extending strict liability to sellers who are not manufacturers, why not require the 
buyer to plead and prove that an intermediate seller contributed to, or failed to 
discover, the defect, or that the manufacturer may not be able to respond in 
damages? If the concern is that the buyer may not be able to prove who caused the 
defect in the product, why not reverse the burden of proof and give an intermediate 
seller an affirmative defense that it did not contribute to or fail to discover the 
defect, and the manufacturer is solvent or insured? 
The assumptions underlying the policy of strict liability would become pure 
guesswork if strict liability is expanded to the agents of sellers, such as brokers 
and sales clerks. Who are these people? How can they avoid accidents? Can they 
bear difficult burdens of proof better? 
An agent for disclosed principal is ordinarily not liable under the contracts 
the agent makes on behalf of the disclosed principal. E.g.„ Restatement of Agency 
(2d) § 302. The salesman at the car dealership makes no personal warranties as to 
the car. Should we divorce strict liability more from its origins in warranty law, 
and make the salesman personally liable in strict liability? 
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Should we make the real estate broker strictly liable for defects in the furnace 
of a home that has been sold? 
The trial court adopted a very, very expansive view of strict products liability: 
The law involved in this lawsuit is known as the law of strict products 
liability. Pursuant to this law, manufacturers, distributors, brokers, as 
well as all other parties in the chain of distribution are strictly liable 
for damages caused by defectively designed products. This is true so long 
as that party is in the business of, and gains profit from, distributing 
or otherwise disposing of the "product" in question through the stream of 
commerce. The primary justification for extending strict liability to all 
in the chain of distribution is to provide the "maximum" protection to the 
consumer. This policy is as applicable to those who never handle or 
control the product, as it is to those who do possess or control the 
product. In either case, consumer protection is the ultimate factor 
considered. Consequently, the handling or possession of the product is 
not a prerequisite for the imposition of strict liability. 
(Instruction No. 11, p. 1385.) What does "other parties in the chain of 
distribution" include? What does "distributing or otherwise disposing of a product" 
mean? Should the jury really be instructed that they should forget the facts: 
"consumer protection is the ultimate factor considered?" 
If that is really all that strict liability is about, why shouldn't we impose 
strict liability on the truck driver that made a wage delivering the trusses, the 
estate of Herb the Colonial salesman that placed the order with Truss Teck, John 
Mark Bangerter the general contractor who built the building and later sold it, the 
carpenters that installed the trusses, the bank that provided construction 
financing, the bank that provided financing to Fairway to purchase the building? 
How about imposing liability on the insurance carrier that insured the property for 
Fairway? Undoubtedly, Fairway could not have obtained financing without assuring 
the bank there was property insurance. The insurance company was an indirect part 
of facilitating the sale of these trusses. Perhaps they "otherwise disposed" of the 
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trusses. And, unlike any of the others mentioned, that insurance company expressly 
agreed to assume the risk we now seek to spread. 
A forgotten lawyer once contently looked back on a long career at the bar and 
said: 
When I was a young lawyer, I lost a few cases I should have won. When I 
was an old lawyer, I won a few cases I should have lost. On the whole, 
justice was done. 
Thatfs not a bad sentiment. And justice "on the average" may be tremendously 
more efficient. 
Criminal prosecutors are charged, not with winning cases, but with doing 
justice. Most are sensitive to the damage to home, reputation and finances that an 
unwarranted criminal charge can bring. As a result, probably 90% of the criminal 
cases brought result in conviction. 
A large percentage of civil cases are settled. There must be a large number of 
civil cases with some merit. Frankly, a plaintiff's lawyer does not stand to make 
much income" from a case he does not at least subjectively believe to have some merit. 
Why don't we say the plaintiff always wins, save the litigation costs and use 
the dough to pay the homeless and hungry? We could have some non-adversarial, 
summary process to keep out the patently frivolous claims. Justice will be done "on 
average" and much more cheaply. 
Such a process would be repugnant to a society that values the individual. And 
like the reminiscent old lawyer, we can only achieve justice on average, and can 
only take some satisfaction in doing so, when we have done our best to achieve 
justice in each and every case. 
-32-
When applied to manufacturers, strict liability appears to be justice Mon 
average." Its policies and assumptions are not flawless, or sacrosanct, or beyond 
critique. But, it offers an improvement over the alternative negligence standard in 
most cases. Arguably, it is the best we can do to achieve justice in each 
individual case. Perhaps it is justified simply because it comports with a 
consensus in our society that those who make dangerous products, even innocently, 
should accept some responsibility for those products. 
When strict liability is applied to sellers who are not manufacturers and who 
did not create the product's flaw, arguably it is not even justice on average. At 
best, it is arguable whether an intermediate seller, when compared to the buyer, can 
best absorb the loss, can best avoid accidents, or can best master difficult issues 
of proof. Arguably, absent some changes it is not the best we can do to achieve 
justice in each individual case. Perhaps it is justifiable because of the knowledge 
that in many cases the loss will be passed by the intermediate seller to the 
manufacturer who should bear the loss. Perhaps, it is justifiable simply because of 
some consensus that sellers who are in the business of selling products should take 
some responsibility for dangerous defects in those products. If there is such a 
consensus it is not as complete, nor as strong, as the consensus regarding 
manufacturers. 
When we seek to expand strict liability to those who are not sellers, the 
assumptions and policies of strict liability do not apply. There is no consensus. 
It does not approach justice "on the average," but rather, is an arbitrary 
reassignment of wealth. 
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POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT DIEHL MBROKEREDM THE TRUSSES IN 
QUESTION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
A jury's finding of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is 
unsupported by substantial admissible evidence: 
The question on appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict is not 
whether there is substantial evidence which would have supported a 
contrary verdict, or even whether this Court, had it been trier of fact, 
would have reached the same verdict as that reached by the jury. Rather, 
the issue is whether the jury's findings are supported by substantial 
competent evidence. 
In re Estate of Kessler, 702 P.2d 86, 95 (Utah 1985). 
Even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's findings, the 
jury's finding that Diehl brokered the trusses in question is not supported by 
substantial admissible evidence. 
The court defined a broker as follows: 
Definition of broker: an agent employed to make bargains and contracts 
for compensation. A middleman or negotiator between parties. A person 
whose business it is to bring buyer and seller together. Buyers and 
sellers of goods and negotiators between buyers and sellers, but without 
having custody of the property. 
(Instruction No. 21, R. 1359; Tr. 456). 
At trial, Fairway called a principal of Colonial Lumber, Rodney W. Gibson. (Tr. 
115-116). Mr. Gibson identified documents which evidenced the sale of the trusses 
in question by Colonial to Bangerter. (Tr. 121-134). 
Gibson testified that he had seen similar documents from Truss Teck to 
Colonial. Colonial frequently received work orders from Truss Teck. Colonial in 
1979 frequently purchased trusses from Truss Teck. When that was done, the billing 
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came through Diehl Lumber, even though the order was placed directly by a Colonial 
salesman to Truss Teck. The procedure was to call Truss Teck directly, not Diehl, 
and reach an agreement directly with Truss Teck. (Tr. 153-159). The exhibit refers 
to "Herb" under the heading of "salesman." Gibson identified Herb as a salesman for 
Colonial that frequently placed orders for trusses. (Tr. 127-128, 172). 
Gibson was then asked about his knowledge of brokering in general. (Tr. 
160-165). Gibson testified that if a broker was involved, the broker would be 
called for a price. The broker negotiated the price. Any arrangements for shipping 
would be made with the broker. In contrast, when Colonial purchased trusses in 1979 
from Truss Teck, they ordered trusses from Truss Teck directly. They did not 
contact Diehl. It was Truss Teck, not Diehl, that negotiated prices. It was Truss 
Teck, not Diehl, that made arrangements for shipping. (Tr. 167-169). 
Gibson was asked about a hearsay, hand-written, notation on a Diehl invoice to 
Colonial which stated that trusses were replaced or repaired "at Diehl." Gibson 
testified that he had no personal knowledge of where the trusses were repaired or 
replaced. He believes they would have been taken back to the manufacturer. The 
reason the invoice was referenced to Diehl, was that the billing came from Diehl. 
(Tr, 165-166), (See also Tr. 170-171). 
Gibson could not say whether, in 1979, Diehl ever called upon Colonial to try 
and sell trusses. (Tr. 172). 
Fairway also called the former president of Truss Teck, Gary Diehl. (Tr. 
291-292). He testified that Truss Teck was started in 1978, the year before these 
trusses were made. (Tr. 295). 
Gary Diehl testified that orders were placed directly with Truss Teck. (Tr. 
302-307). 
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Gary Diehl testified that in 1979, Truss Teck had its own sales staff and did 
its own marketing of trusses. Truss Teck sold trusses directly to their customer. 
Diehlfs only role in the sale of trusses was to bill accounts receivable. Diehl 
deducted five percent from the gross sales price. The reason Diehl was asked to 
perform the billing function was that Truss Teck did not have its own computer or 
accounting staff. (Tr. 310-312, 318-320, 326). Gary Diehl testified that sometime 
after 1979, Truss Teck acquired its own computer and performed its own billing. 
(Tr. 325). Gary Diehl testified that during the period that he operated Truss Teck, 
he did not recall a situation where customers were sent to Truss Teck by Diehl. 
(Tr. 325). He testified that there was no brokerage relationship with Diehl. (Tr. 
327-328). 
Fairway then called Bruce Hiller, the chief financial officer of Diehl Lumber. 
(Tr. 328-329). 
Mr. Hiller was asked whether Diehl was involved in brokering roof trusses. His 
response was that it depends on how the term "brokerage" is defined. (Tr. 314). 
The Court asked Mr. Hiller to define the manner in which he used the term, but he 
was not given a chance by counsel. (Tr. 335). 
Counsel again returned to the question, "did Diehl broker roof trusses in 
1979." Again, Mr. Hiller asked for definition of the term "broker." (Tr. 
335-336). The court again suggested that Hiller be allowed to define the term 
"broker," again, to no avail: 
THE COURT: I think he must be allowed to answer what he means by the term 
or he can't answer your question. 
Question. (By Mr. Katsaros) Mr. Hiller, when Diehl Lumber sells roof 
trusses, do they try to earn a profit or percentage of the gross sale on 
that truss? 
(Tr. 336). 
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Having been successful at ignoring several requests by counsel, the witness and 
the court for a definition of the term "broker," counsel returned to the question 
whether Diehl brokered trusses. Mr. Hiller testified that in 1979, with regard to 
the sale of any trusses, Diehl performed the accounting, but did not get involved in 
the sale itself. (Tr. 336). 
Mr. Hiller was then asked to read from his deposition: 
To the best of my knowledge we were a broker of trusses. In 1979 if an 
order for trusses was called from a customer it would have had to have 
gone to another company such as one who manufactured trusses. That 
company would deliver them. We would broker trusses for a company and do 
the billing and sometimes ship trusses in our trucks with other materials 
as a convenience and take a broker commission only, but we did not take 
orders for trusses in 1979. 
Q. So if someone called you, say Colonial Lumber called and wanted to 
buy some trusses from Diehl Lumber, was it a procedure that you would then 
refer them to another company? 
A. We would refer them to the manufacturer. 
Q. In this instance, who were you brokering trusses for in 1979? 
A. Primarily, Truss Teck, Inc. 
Q. You say primarily. Do you know of any trusses that were purchased 
from any other company or brokered from any other company except Truss 
Teck. 
A. We may have. I don't recall. 
Q. You don't have any personal knowledge? 
A. No. 
Q. But, you were definitely brokering from Truss Teck? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. 339-340). 
Finally, Mr. Hiller was given a definition of the term "broker." He made it 
clear that in 1979, orders for trusses were taken by Truss Teck, not Diehl. Diehl 
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did not actively pursue truss buyers, but did perform a bookkeeping function. He 
also made it clear that he "would use the term broker very loosely as a general 
term." Customers who called wanting trusses were referred to Truss Teck only as a 
matter of courtesy. (Tr. 345-352). 
The only thing supporting the jury's finding that Diehl brokered trusses was Mr. 
Hiller's confusion over the term and his use, or more appropriately his misuse, of 
the term in a very general sense, rather than in the manner in which it was defined 
by the court. 
Moreover, the only evidence concerning what happened with these very trusses is 
the documentary evidence which indicates Truss Teck filled out a work order 
describing the trusses in question as having been ordered by Herb of Colonial 
Lumber. The trusses were picked up by Colonial. Sometime later, an invoice was 
generated by Diehl to Colonial. That invoice did not contain any mark-up in price. 
Colonial then sent its invoice to its customer, Bangerter, this time with a mark-up 
to reflect the fact that Colonial had purchased and resold trusses in question. 
The testimony was uncontroverted that Truss Teck took its own orders. Colonial 
would place orders directly with Truss Teck. The trusses would then be manufactured 
and delivered or picked up. Diehl would then generate an invoice and perform the 
billing for Truss Teck. 
Even the confused testimony of Mr. Hiller makes it clear that Diehl did not take 
orders for trusses in 1979. Customers wanting trusses would be referred to someone 
else as a matter of courtesy. 
It is true that a jury verdict should not be disturbed if it is supported by 
substantial admissible evidence. The jury's finding that Diehl brokered the trusses 
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in this case is supported by nothing more than confusion over the definition of a 
legal term, not evidence. 
POINT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IRRELEVANT AND 
PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE OF DIEHL'S WEALTH AND ERRED WHEN IT 
FAILED TO GIVE A CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION. 
Over Diehl's objection, Fairway was allowed to put on evidence concerning 
Diehl's wealth. (Tr. 330-331). This evidence was not even calculated to be 
relevant, and should have been excluded. U. R. Evid. 402. 
Not only was the evidence irrelevant and inadmissible, it was prejudicial. 
E.g., Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121, 1132 (Wyo. 1981). In that case, the Wyoming 
Supreme Court held that it was not only prejudicial error to introduce evidence of a 
defendant's wealth in a case where only compensatory damages were involved, it was 
reversible error to introduce evidence of a defendant's wealth in a case where 
punitive damages were claimed, if the evidence was introduced before the jury 
returned a finding that punitive damages were appropriate. 
It is a good guess that rich men do not fair well before juries, and the 
more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fair . . . . 
Id. at 1128 (quoting Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1191 
(1931). 
It is impossible to say that the jury's verdict of compensatory damages 
was not effected by its knowledge that Schlumberger had a deep pocket and 
that the award would be satisfied from that pocket. 
Id. at 1132. 
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When defendant asked for an instruction to reduce the prejudice, the trial court 
refused. (Tr. 453). 
POINT V 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IRRELEVANT AND 
PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE UNPLED THEORY OF 
"SUCCESSOR LIABILITY/' AND ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GIVE A 
CORRECTIVE INSTRUCTION. 
A corporation which purchases assets from a product manufacturer is generally 
not liable for injuries caused by products manufactured by the selling company prior 
to the purchase transaction. Some courts have recognized four exceptions to this 
general rule of nonliability. The purchaser may be liable where: (1) the successor 
assumes the selling company's liabilities; (2) the transaction constitutes a merger 
or consolidation; (3) the successor is a mere continuation of the selling company; 
or (4) the transaction was a fraudulent attempt to avoid liability. E.g., Florum v. 
Elliott Mfr. Co., 629 F. Supp. 1145 (D. Colo. 1986); Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
(5th ed.) p. 707 (Supp. 1988). 
The California Supreme Court, in the case of Ray v. Alad Corp. , 19 Cal. 3d 22, 
136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 560 P.2d 3 (1977), created an additional exception, called the 
"product line" theory. Most courts have rejected it. Prosser and Keeton on Torts 
(5th ed.) p. 707 (Supp. 1988); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach. , Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515 
(S.D. 1986); Fish v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 126 Wis. 2d 293, 376 N.W.2d 820 (1985). 
Diehl first learned that Fairway intended to claim that Diehl was liable for the 
acts of Truss Teck under a theory of successor liability when Diehl received 
Fairway's proposed jury instructions. The claim of successor liability was not 
stated in either the Amended Complaint or the Pre-trial Order. 
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Diehl filed a written objection to the case being tried on a successor liability 
theory. (R. 1198-1204). The objection was in effect a motion in limine. 
Despite Diehlfs objection, Fairway was allowed to introduce a great deal of 
evidence under the guise of "successor liability/1 which was really calculated to 
support Fairway's unstated theory of guilt by association. (Tr. 291-302, 309, 
314-321, 324-325, 331-332, 353-354). 
The trial court granted Diehl's motion for directed verdict on the issue of 
successor liability. (Tr. 364-368). However, the court refused to give an 
instruction requested by Diehl which would have reduced some of the risks that the 
jury's verdict would be based on guilt by association. 
POINT VI 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING DIEHL'S CONTRIBUTION 
AND INDEMNIFICATION CLAIMS AGAINST TRUSWAL. 
In 1983, the Utah Legislature enacted a series of statutes which provided for 
contribution among joint tortfeasors. 1973 Utah Laws, Ch. 209, §§ 3-7; former Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38 through 78-27-43. In 1986, the Legislature abolished joint 
and several liability and repealed these provisions. Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-27-38 
through 78-27-43 (1953); 1986 Utah Laws, Ch. 199, §§ 2-7. 
In the case of Stephens v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987), this court 
addressed the issue of the application of the new act to accidents which occurred 
before the effective date of the act. This court held that the new act did not 
apply retroactively to cases which arose from accidents which occurred before the 
effective date of the statute. 
Truswal answered Fairway's complaint and raised a cross-claim against Diehl. 
(R. 123-131). Diehl responded and counterclaimed against Truswal, seeking 
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contribution or indemnification. (R. 153-157), Under the Stephens decision, the 
old statute applies to those claims. 
Under the old statute, a settling joint tortfeasor could not resolve a claim for 
contribution by settling with the plaintiff and obtaining a release, unless the 
release provided that any judgment recovered from the remaining joint tortfeasors 
was diminished by the greater of the settling party's pro rata share of fault or the 
amount paid by the settling tortfeasor: 
(1) A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor does not 
relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint 
tort-feasor unless that release: 
(a) is given before the right of the other tort-feasor to secure a 
money judgment for contribution has accrued; and 
(b) Provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro-rata share of 
the released tort-feasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable 
against all the other tort-feasors. 
(2) This section shall apply only if the issue of proportionate fault is 
litigated between joint tort-feasors in the same action. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-43; 1973 Utah Laws, Ch. 209, § 7. 
At final pre-trial on October 13, approximately fourteen days before trial, 
Fairway mentioned that they had settled with Truswal. Diehl made it clear that it 
had a contribution claim and expected to have any judgment against it reduced by the 
greater of the amount of Truswal's fault or the amount paid by Truswal in 
settlement, and expected to have Truswalfs fault determined at trial. In the 
alternative, Diehl expected to have Truswal at trial or have a fault judgment if 
Truswal failed to show. (Tr., October 13, 1987, 22-27). 
A dispute arose between Truswal and Fairway regarding whether or not the release 
would settle contribution claims. (R. 1053-1061, 1122, 1135, 1142-1197). The court 
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failed to resolve the issue before trial. (Tr., October 27, 1987, 3, 15-38; Tr. 
5-11, 14-15). Despite the lack of a resolution of the issue regarding the form of 
the release, Truswal was excused from trial. (Tr. 5-8). 
The confusion over whether or not Diehl had a contribution claim against Truswal 
lingered throughout the trial. (Tr. 233-247). 
The court erred in dismissing Truswal without first determining whether or not 
Truswal had obtained a release which comported with the statute. 
The issue of Truswal's fault was ultimately submitted to the jury, but the 
confusion prevented a full and fair trial on that issue. 
POINT VII 
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT TRUSWAL WAS NOT AT FAULT FOR THE 
DEFECTS IN THE TRUSSES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
The jury's finding that Truswal was not at fault for the defects in the trusses 
is the product of confusion, and is not supported by substantial, admissible 
evidence. 
Rodney Gibson, who was called by Fairway, testified that after Colonial had 
received a request by a customer for trusses, they contacted truss manufacturers to 
receive bids. Truss Teck was one of those manufacturers. 
If the price was acceptable to Colonial's customer, the truss manufacturer would 
submit truss engineering drawings to be approved by Colonial's customer. (Tr. 
156-157, 432-34). Gibson testified that Colonial did a lot of business with Truss 
Teck. He does not recall not receiving design drawings from Truss Teck. Truswal's 
name was stamped on those engineering drawings. (Tr. 441). He further testified 
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that ordinarily contractors will not purchase trusses without stamped drawings. 
(Tr. 442). 
Gary Diehl testified that Truss Teck did not employ any engineers. (Tr. 298). 
When Truss Teck's customers called to order trusses, the customer gave Truss Teck 
the building dimensions and some design information. Truss Teck then called Truswal 
for engineering. Truss Teck stocked plates purchased from Truswal. In return for 
purchasing the plates, Truss Teck was entitled to receive Truswal's engineering free 
of charge. Truss Teck used Truswal designs exclusively in 1979. (Tr. 303-308, 
312-314, 321-322). The trusses were delivered with Truss Teck's work order, and a 
copy of the design drawing. (Tr. 326). Truss Teck never attempted to do its own 
design work. (Tr. 313-314). 
Fairway called Arnold Coon, a consulting engineer, as an expert witness. (Tr. 
174). Mr. Coon testified that he was familiar with Truswal. He testified that 
Truswal made barbed truss plates and furnished computer designs, depicting the size 
thickness of plates and the type of lumber, to truss manufactures. That was the 
standard practice in the industry. (Tr. 212-216, 220). He testified of his own 
personal knowledge that the plates in question were manufactured by Truswal. (Tr. 
214). He testified that it was not likely that Truswal plates were used with 
someone else's design. That would be inconsistent with industry standards. (Tr. 
215). 
Mr. Coon testified that a manufacturing defect, the misplacement of plates, 
contributed to the problem. However, he admitted that the collapse would still have 
occurred even with correct placement. (Tr. 219). 
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Diehl called Vance T. Christensen, a consulting engineer, as an expert witness. 
(Tr. 369-376). He also testified that there was a design defect and the trusses 
would have collapsed even without a misplacement of plates. (Tr. 393). 
Mr. Christensen testified that truss plate manufacturers, such as Truswal and 
others, design trusses and send design drawings to fabricators for review. 
Fabricators do not ordinarily engineer trusses. Fabricators use the engineering 
which is supplied free when plates are purchased. That is a standard industry 
practice. Even consulting engineers such as himself and Mr. Coon rely on plate 
companies1 engineering. (Tr. 394-395). He testified that plate designers should be 
responsible for any reasonably foreseeable construction errors. Plate size is a 
primary concern and it is the plate manufacturers which specify the size. 
Fabricators follow that specification. (Tr. 402-405). He testified that it would 
be very unusual for a truss manufacturer to deviate from the plate required by the 
suppliers design. (Tr. 411-412). 
Despite uncontroverted evidence that: (1) the trusses in question were 
defective; (2) the major defect was a design error; (3) the design error was of 
sufficient magnitude to have caused the collapse, even without any manufacturing 
error; (4) the plates in question were Truswal plates; (5) Truss Teck manufactured 
the trusses; (6) Truss Teck used only Truswal plates; (7) Truss Teck used only 
Truswal designs; and (8) it would have been highly unusual, given the standard in 
the industry, for Truss Teck to have used anything other than the Truswal design, 
the jury found that Truswal was not at fault. The jury's finding in that regard 
should be reversed. It is not supported by any evidence, let alone substantial 
admissible evidence. It is the product of confusion and conjecture. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial erred in allowing Fairway to assert a strict liability claim. That 
error was contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and an abuse of discretion. 
Since that strict liability claim was the only claim before the district court at 
trial, the judgment against Diehl should be reversed, and the trial court should be 
directed to enter an order dismissing Fairway's claim against Diehl with prejudice. 
The jury correctly found that Diehl was not a seller of the trusses in question 
within the meaning of Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts (2d). The court 
erred as a matter of law in entering judgment against Diehl. Judgment against Diehl 
should be reversed, and the trial court should be directed to enter an order 
dismissing Fairway's claims against Diehl with prejudice. 
The jury's finding that Diehl "brokered" the trusses in question is not 
supported by substantial, admissible evidence. Again, the judgment should be 
reversed, with instructions to the trial court to enter an order of dismissal. 
The trial court committed prejudicial error when it allowed Fairway to introduce 
evidence of the wealth of Diehl over Diehl's objection. The trial court compounded 
the error by refusing to give a corrective instruction. At a minimum, the judgment 
should be reversed for a new trial. 
Similarly, the district committed prejudicial error when it allowed Fairway to 
introduce irrelevant and prejudicial evidence under the guise that it supported a 
claim of "successor liability." That evidence was nothing more than an attempt to 
produce a jury verdict from guilt by association. The trial court compounded the 
error by refusing to give a corrective jury instruction. At a minimum, judgment 
against Diehl should be reversed for a new trial. 
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The trial court committed prejudicial error when it dismissed Diehl's 
contribution and indemnification claims against Truswal. Diehl was entitled to have 
Truswal's fault weighed by the jury. Instead, the procedure adopted by the district 
court resulted in prejudicial confusion. At a minimum, the judgment against Diehl 
should be reversed for a new trial to determine Truswal's fault. 
The jury's finding that Truswal was not at fault for the collapse in question is 
not supported by substantial, admissible evidence. At a minimum, judgment against 
Diehl should be reversed for a new trial on that issue. 
, 1988. 
iew j. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this !> day of 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 
By 
SfiSrdfT:. D r a n e y ^ 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Dieh l Lumber Comizfany 
SCMSED407 
- 4 7 -
A P P E N D I X 
s 
o 
T 
o 
y/^/f & ^ 
INVOICE 
200 SOUTH 200 WEST BOUNTIFUL, UTAH M010 
PHONE 295*9471 No. C18958 
T« 
O 
CL SLS NO 
DUE 10TH OF MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASES 
INV DATE CUST ORDER NO ORDER DATE 
10r: SERVICE CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
DELIVERED BY - DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS 
IF 
% 
'ZJL w r» 6UAT lrj9S8 SHIPPED D E S C R I P T I O N 
^/-*£S /^ 
QUANTITY E5 PRICE UNIT AMOUNT 
/ 
T 
3JI3Z50 EA 43 3250 
tff '-1*: 
JfW< 
VA 
•*=* 
^n. 
SUB TOTAL 
3,13250 
DRAYAGE TAX 1 
15«*3 
TAX 2 V83J 3* 
WE AGREE - TO PAY 1 * % PER MONTH CARRYING CHARGE ON 
PAST DUE ACCOUNTS (18% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE), that 
title to above property remains in Colonial Lumber Inc. until fully paid 
lor, mat rf collection ot this account becomes necessary, to pBy cost 
9f collection including court costs and a reasonable attorneys fee. 
s 
o 
L 
o 
T 
O 
UMBER INC. 
200 SOUTH 200 WEST BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 04010 
PHONE 295-9471 
l'.oi vs.mu roo FAST 
UUMIrUL, JJlAH 04010 
No. C17733 
S . 
H 
I 
P" 
T -
O 
/"Jr. {,+* Ltl. 
r*>t*wifi^\c\ 
JIJLL ***/J tfti/eti 
CL SIS NO 
DUE 10TH OF MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASES 
INV DATE 
-U 
CUST ORDER NO ORDER DATE 
10 r SERVICE CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
DELIVERED BY - DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS 
YsJtfrifii 9>/M# 17.733 
SHIPPED ORDERED D E S C R I P T I O N QUANTITY PRICE UNIT AMOUNT 
/ < • 
-XL 
;/ l* - to 
1 * 4 \ - 20 
Se/)jrf 
320 
sis "*A 
320J3QM BF] 102*0 
10 
/ * c?< * r f/» 6 /CT>V 
10 
0 ft 
J&o M $pc 
- V /V/> 
3L3C 
SUB TOTAL 
nrt SM 
TAX 2 
1ta3* 
WE AGREE - TO PAY 1V*% PER MONTH CARRYING CHARGE ON 
PAST DUE ACCOUNTS (18% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE), that 
title to above property remains in Colonial Lumber Inc until fully paid 
for, that if collection of this account becomes necessary, to pay cost 
of collection Including court costs and a reasonable attorneys fee 
PAY THIS AMOUNT 
ffflfpfjJMBEflMC. PHONE 295-9471 
s 
o 
L 
D 
T 
O 
1-0! rrrjH ?co n:i 
Kl \T lFu l . f UTM CA010 
No. C18542 
T-
O 
CL 
DUE 10TH OF MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASES 
SLS NO INV DATE CUST ORDER NO ORDER DATE 
10rt SERVICE CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
DELIVERED BY - DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS 
-4 
CO 
M(rf%* 18£<*2 
SHIPPED ORDERED D E S C R I P T I O N QUANTITY PRICE UNIT AMOUNT 
-x%. 12* 
J '7r& I 
6SQP0H BFi 2IO60 
K 
"DRAYAGT" SUBTOTAL 
710610 
TAX 1 TAX 2 
'M LM2L 22*23* 
W E AGREE - TO PAY 1V*% PER MONTH CARRYING CHARGE ON 
PAST DUE ACCOUNTS (18% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE) that 
title to above property remains in Colontat Lumber Inc until fully paid 
for, that if collection of this account becomes necessary to pay cost* J% Oc** 
of collection including court costs and a reasonable attorney a fee * RECEIVED BY 
100 SOUTH 200 WEST BOUNTIFUL, UTAH 14010 
UMBER INC, PHONE 295-S471 
s i£~{ r;:rr.::n 
° yffai uzrau zoo FAGT 
o r,ru:.TirUL, UTA:I C':OIO 
T 
O 
No. C18944 
i 
P" 
T -
O 
CL SLS NO 
UJE \ZVA Or MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASES 
~W^\ INV DATE CUST ORDER NO ORDER DATE 
10r SERVICE CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
DELIVERED BY - DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS 
0 
"*^ 
CD| SHIPPED ORDERED D E S C R I P T I O N OU/ IANTITY PRICE UNIT AMOUNT 
V3o ¥*?- 5<f / j^L 
-T$r igttr 3Uii)0H SFl l ^ t f U 
4 W -
dcrv^f s/^&<^-~e 
/.Uc*/* (^&£^?t^- ^-# W EA 2 * * M 
7A3 EA - ? * * 
+ M K 
L
*-^#-*-s> 
j ^ 4 ^ /Ws's*"*/ 44V J 8 EA 4K£^ / / - # 
2 X' k 
3200 SA 4W-
6 ^ 2 y<-/ ^ ^ 
16\,18 fc\ U ?2\ i i kass 
2/s J& • 
31SP0M BFt 177/J7-
>%} y* zv, 
pi • / 
V • 
. , . - 4 ? ? 
SUBTOTAL 
: AQREE -1 
DRAYAGt TAX 1 
1M1 
TAX 2 TAX 3 -IT 
teBQfi5* 
W E  - TO PAY 1V4% PER MONTH CARRYING CHARGE ON 
PAST DUE ACCOUNTS (18% ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE), that 
title to above property remains in Colonial Lumber Inc until fully paid 
lor. that H collection of this account becomes necessary, to pay cost 
of collection including court costs and a reasonable attorney's fee 
PAY THIS MHXJNT 
1^ 8169 SOUTH STATE - TELEPHONE (801) 566-3611 
TRUSS 
rxrcK 
VA/c. MIDVALE, UTAH 84047 Mi 
DTO / I ^ . / ' t^<^0 SHIP TO 
O^^O^ 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT 
MX **-*»' 
l A L L b M A N N O < L N N L L U L J O B O R P L A N 
tha huyar, harahy acknowladoa purchata mnd ord«r of abova datcribad march andlta. Tttla to abova 
Inc. or Miignt until all lumi dua und«r this con 
tion by «uit or otharwifta, I agraa to pay •!! attOrnay faat 
»rchandi»a shall rmmiln with Truft Tack aasig mr 
d hava haan paid »n full. In cat* o» collartl  " " "" ' 
d cott» Incurred. 
RECEIVED BY. 
A FINANCE CHARGE OF 1%% PER MONTH 
WHICH IS 18% PER ANNUM WILL BE CHARGED 
ON ALL ACCOUNTS NOT PAID BY 30TH OF MONTH 
FOLLOWING PURCHASE. 
LUMBER PRODUCTS, .NC. 
1756 SOUTH 700 WEST - TELEPHONE (801) 972 • 8300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84104 
Remit To: DIEHL LUMBER PRODUCTS INC. 
P.O. BOX 25067 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84125 
SOLD TO: 
I N V O I C E 
D A T E 
COLONIAL LUMBER 
2ND SOUTH 2N0 EAST 
BOUNTIFUL* UTAH 
PM010 
SHIP TO: SAME 
7/31/79 
ITEM 1 
INVOICE 
NUMBER 
27605 
SALES 
CATEGORY 
CUSTOMER 
NUMBER 
1?80 
CUSTOMER PURCHASE ORDER NUMBERS 
lHUUb 
ITEM 2 ITEM 3 
PRICE BASIS 
ITEM 4 
DATE SHIPPED 
w/c 
DELIVERY TICKET NUMBERS 
ITEM 2 ITEM 3 ITEM ITEM 1 
TTTS-
QUANTITY PRICE UNIT AMOUN STOCK NO. r H 
19 4 
QUANTITY 
ORDERED 
36, 
QUANTITY 
SHIPPED D E S C R I P T I O N 
36. HOUSt TRUSSES 
SUBTOTAL 
V^'-Z*3^* 
PLAINTIFF'S 
IXHIMT 
TOTAL INVOICE-
YOUR DISCOUNT - IF PAID BY 
3 6 . 74*65 EA 2697* 
2 . 6 8 7 , 
2*6&7 
5 3 , 7 5 AUG 10 79 INVOICE 
PLEASE P 
AMOUNT Sr 
ABOVf 
CONDITION OF SALE: A FINANCE CHARGE OF 1%% PER MONTH WHICH IS 18% PER ANNUM WILL BE CHARGED ON ALL J 
COUNTS NOT PAID BY 30th OF MONTH FOLLOWING PURCHASE. 
TERMS: YARD SALES 2% 10th PROX - DIRECT SALES 2% 10 DAYS ADI-ADF. 
• THIS IS YOUR INVOICE - WE DO NOT ITEMIZE AGAIN • 10% SERVICE CHARGE ON ALL RETURNED MERCHANDISE 
. . . . . . . ~ « » . ^ « » ^ - QUALITY FOREST PRODUCTS FOR OVER 40 YEARS • QUALITY DOUGLAS FlR • PONOEROSA ft SUGAR PINE ^ / / . ^ ^ . X Qj4 
FILED IN C'.tRK-i OrFICF 
DAVIS CO'JNi'Y.iJTAH 
1397 NOV - 2 AH & <»6 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT |^ :-jW©G?pJBF!!;H.CLEPK 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UT^t Vl J'*'t'' CCURT 
nv V ^ N 
LLiUTY CL:.:";K 
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION, 
Defendant. 
et al, ] 
) SPECIAL VERDICT 
> Civil N o . 37017 
Members of the jury: 
This is a special verdict form containing several questions, 
each of which must be answered by you in accordance with the 
Court's instructions and the following comments. Each question 
must be answered with the word "Yes" or "No." You can answer 
"Yes" only if there is a preponderance of the evidence concerning 
the question. In the event you find the evidence preponderates 
against the question presented, then you must answer it "No." 
An agreement of six jurors (not eight jurors) is required to 
answer each question, and when any six jurors agree upon an 
answer, you should have the Chair write in the answer and then 
proceed to the next question as appropriate. 
When you have answered all of the questions required, the 
Chair should then sign and date this special verdict and return 
it to the courtroom. 
WE, THE JURY IN THE ABOVE-CAPTIONED ACTION, for our special 
verdict, answer the questions submitted as follows: 
Question 1: Was Colonial Lumber, Inc. a seller of the 
trusses in this case to John Mark Bangerter? 
Answer: ^^ 
(Yes or No) 
Questions 2: Was Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. only a 
bookkeeper for Truss Tek Inc. for the truss sale involved in this 
case? 
FILMED 
Answer: ^ ^ 
No) (Yes or 
Question 3: Was Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. a broker 
between Colonial Lumber, Inc. and Truss Tek Inc. for the truss 
sale involved in this case? 
Answer: 
Yes or No) 
Question 4: Did Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. sell the 
trusses in this case to Colonial Lumber, Inc.? 
Answer: ^ 
(Yes or Ntf) 
Question 5: Were the trusses in question dangerously and 
unreasonably defective at the time they were delivered to John 
Mark Bangerter? 
Answer: 
(Yes or No) 
Question 6: Was any unreasonably dangerous defect in the 
trusses a proximate cause of plaintiff's damages? 
Answer: J^ 
(Yes or No) 
Question 7: What amount of money will fairly and adequately 
compensate the plaintiffs for the damages they reasonably 
sustained as a result of the accident in question? 
$ i S. o° c >*° 
Question 8: Considering the fault, if any, of each 
participant in the design, manufacture, delivery, and 
construction of the trusses in this case, weigh the contribution 
to plaintiffs' damages of each. Your answer should be stated in 
terms of percentages and should add up to 100% 
Fault of Truswal Systems, Inc. 0 % 
Fault of Truss Tek Inc. &Q % 
Fault of Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. 5 % 
Fault of Colonial Lumber, Inc. 
Fault of John Mark Bangerter Q % 
TOTAL 100% 
Dated October 30, 1987. 
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CHAIR 
MERLIN O. BAKER of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
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PETER M. KATSAROS 
CLAUSEN, MILLER, GORMAN, 
CAFFREY & WITOUS, P.C. 
10 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Telephone: (312) 855-1010 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
FAIRWAY DISTRIBUTING CO.; : 
FAIRWAY LIMITED, a partnership, 
Plaintiffs, 
: JUDGMENT 
v. 
BANGERTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; 
JOHN MARK BANGERTER; BONNEVILLE : 
ENGINEERING, INC.; TRUSWAL 
SYSTEMS, INC.; COLONIAL LUMBER, : 
INC.; and DIEHL LUMBER COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
: Civil No. 37017 
JOHN MARK BANGERTER, 
Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
" L E ? ' I N I J L E R K ' S OFFICf 
DAVIS COUNTY. UTAH 
mm-k AMD39 
MICHACL G At.LPiCN.CLEUK 
2MO DlSIhlCT COURT 
BY 
etrUi f CLtfvh 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of 
Reading Pennsylvania; CNA : 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, TRUCK 
INSURANCE EXCHANGE and : 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, 
Third-Party 
Defendants• : 
ooOoo 
This action came on for trial before the Court and a Jury, 
the Honorable Douglas Cornaby, District Judge, presiding, and the 
issues having been duly tried and the jury having duly answered 
Special Interrogatories and rendered its verdict on October 30, 
1987, and having awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs, 
Fairway Distributing Co. and Fairway Limited, and against the 
defendants, Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. and Colonial Lumber, Inc. 
in the amount of $75,000.00, and the defendants being entitled to 
a credit of $6,500.00, the amount of settlement proceeds paid by 
Truswal Systems, Inc. to plaintiffs, and the Court having 
determined that the plaintiffs are entitled to pre-judgment 
interest on the balance of $68,500.00 at the statutory rate of 10% 
per annum from March 5, 1984 to the date of the entry of judgment 
in the amount of $26,543.00. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiffs, 
Fairway Distributing Co. and Fairway Limited, have judgment 
against the defendants, Diehl Lumber Products, Inc. and Colonial 
Lumber, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of $95,043.00, 
and plaintiffs' costs of this action. 
-2-
DATED this </ day of Januory, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
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